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I.

INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum surveys the case law of the international criminal tribunals regarding

the degree of precision required of an indictment and how that case law might apply to the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”). This memorandum will pay particular attention to the
level of precision required for charges of superior responsibility. The issue of precision in
indictments is an essential one, since an indictment pleaded with insufficient particularity is
defective.1 Additionally, nearly every indictment before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has been challenged
and nearly every indictment before those tribunals has been amended at least once.2
B. Summary of conclusions
i. Indictments before international tribunals generally require less
specificity than those before domestic legal systems.
The extraordinary nature of the crimes addressed by international tribunals often makes it
impossible to plead an indictment with as much detail as would be required by a domestic court.
Crimes such as genocide, for example, render it impracticable or impossible to identify every
victim or give their precise times and dates of death. International tribunals, therefore, do not



“What does the case law of international criminal tribunals provide about how precise an indictment has to be? If
the Prosecutor charges superior responsibility, how specifically must subordinates be identified? How might the
case law of the other international tribunals apply at the STL?”
1

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Radic, Zigic, & Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 31 (Feb. 28,
2005) (“An indictment may also be defective when the material facts are pleaded without sufficient specificity, such
as, unless there are special circumstances, when the times refer to broad date ranges, the places are only generally
indicated, and the victims are only generally identified.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
2

VLADIMIR TOCHILOVSKY, JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 2 (2008) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
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require the same level of precision for such matters as a court in a domestic legal system usually
would.
ii. An indictment is pleaded with sufficient precision if it sets out the
material facts of the Prosecution’s case with enough detail to inform
the accused clearly of the charges against him so that he may prepare
a defense.
Case law from the ICTY and the ICTR recognize that the sufficiency of an indictment is
inextricably intertwined with the right of an accused to mount a defense. The accused must be
able to identify both the specific charges brought against him and the underlying actions which
form the bases of those charges. What facts a tribunal considers “material” is dependent on the
nature of the Prosecution’s case. A helpful way for a prosecutor to determine whether the
indictment is sufficiently precise would be to ask herself: “if I were representing the accused,
would this indictment provide me with enough information to prepare an effective defense?”
iii. The mode of liability must be clearly alleged.
The accused must be clearly informed of his own mode of liability and the acts of alleged
accomplices if a form of accomplice liability is alleged. The mode of liability is always
considered a material fact.
iv. The level of detail required regarding the accused’s role in the alleged
acts is dependent on his proximity to those acts.
It is essential for the accused to know from the indictment what his proximity to the acts
in question is alleged to have been. An indictment of someone alleged to have physically
committed the alleged act requires more specificity than an indictment of someone further
removed from the act in question, such as someone alleged to have planned, instigated, ordered
or had superior responsibility over the perpetrators of the act.

7

v. When pleading Superior Responsibility, the indictment must allege
what conduct on the part of accused created his liability as a superior,
as well as the conduct of those for whom he is alleged to have been
responsible.
The indictment must specify the conduct of the alleged superior and the conduct of the
alleged subordinates that created liability, subject to the prosecution’s ability to provide those
details. The indictment should identify the direct perpetrators as specifically as possible. If the
prosecution is unable to identify the direct perpetrators by name, it is sufficient to identify them
by their “category” as a group or by their official position. Those in the group may be
sufficiently identified by their status and presence at a specific location at a specific time.
vi. The STL is unique among international criminal tribunals in both the
scope and nature of the crime it was created to prosecute, which could
lead to a higher requirement of specificity in indictments.
The current standard for indictments before international criminal tribunals is a result of
the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the crimes they were created to address.3 Many of
those circumstances are not present in the matters before the STL, which might lead the Tribunal
to conclude that a higher standard of precision within indictments is required. The extraordinary
nature of the specific crimes before the STL, however, along with the desirability of maintaining
uniformity within international criminal law could justify the use of the existing specificity
standard employed by the other international tribunals.
II.

STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
INDICTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

The enacting statute of STL gives the following requirements for indictments before the
Tribunal:

3

See supra Part I.B.i.
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Art. 16(4): In the determination of any charge against the accused
pursuant to this Statute, he or she shall be entitled to the following
minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge against
him or her;4
Art. 18(1): The Pre-Trial Judge shall review the indictment. If
satisfied that a prima facie case has been established by the
Prosecutor, he or she shall confirm the indictment. If he or she is
not so satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed.5
The statute requires the accused be informed of the charges “in detail,” but does not specify what
level of detail is necessary. The STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide a slightly more
specific explanation of the detail required of indictments:
Rule 68(d): The indictment shall set forth the name and particulars
of the suspect and a concise statement of the facts of the case and
of the crime with which the suspect is charged.6
The requirement that the statement of the case and crime be “concise” appears to create an
implicit—though indefinite—limit on the amount of detail contained in that statement. The
statute is clear that the specific crime with which the accused is charged must be included, in
addition to the “facts of the case.” There is not currently any case law from the STL to aid in
interpreting the statutory and procedural requirements for indictments, but other international
tribunals have substantial case law on the issue.

4

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. RES. 1757, art. 16(4)(a), U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (2007)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36]. This language is identical to Article 14(3)(a) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
14(3)(a), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
5

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 18(1). For a thorough discussion of confirmation of indictments
and prima facie cases, see Memorandum from Kevin Griffith to the Office the Prosecutor for the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon (April 13, 2010) (on file with the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center).
6

Special Tribunal for Lebanon Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 68(d), U.N. DOC. STL/BD/2009/01/Rev. 2
(Oct. 30, 2009) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
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A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The statute for International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and
its Rules of Procedure and evidence have substantially similar requirements for indictments as
the STL. The statute states:
Art. 18(4): Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the
Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise
statement of the facts and the crime or crimes with which the
accused is charged under the Statute. The indictment shall be
transmitted to a judge of the Trial Chamber.7
The ICTY has defined a prima facie as “a credible case which would (if not contradicted by the
defence) be a sufficient basis to convict the accused on the charge.”8 The language of Article
18(4) is echoed in Rule 47(C) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and evidence, which states:
The indictment shall set forth the name and particulars of the suspect,
and a concise statement of the facts of the case and of the crime with
which the suspect is charged.9

Given the similar language between Rule 47(C) and the STL’s Rule 68(d), and the substantial
amount of case law that the ICTY has generate on the subject, cases from the ICTY should be
particularly relevant to indictments before the STL.
B. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Article 17(4) of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)
is identical to Article 18(4) of the ICTY’s statute.10 Similarly, Rule 47(C) of the ICTR’s Rules

7

Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 18(4) (Sept. 2009)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
8

GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 95 (2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
9

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 47(C), U.N.
DOC. IT/32/Rev.44 (Dec. 10, 2009) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
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of Procedure and Evidence is identical to Rule 47(C) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.11 Like the ICTY, these are substantially similar to indictment requirements for the
STL and ICTR case law regarding indictments should be a useful guidepost for indictment
standards at the STL.
C. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Rule 67(2) of the Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”) states:
The Indictment shall be void for procedural defect unless it sets out
the identity of the Accused, a description of the material facts and
their legal characterisation by the Co-Investigating Judges,
including the relevant criminal provisions and the nature of the
criminal responsibility.12
The ECCC, like the STL, ICTY, and ICTR, requires the indictment provide the identity of the
accused, the facts of the case, and the crimes with which the accused is charged. Also like the
STL, ICTY, and the ICTR, the ECCC is silent on the level of precision required to sufficiently
set out that information. Unlike the STL, ICTY, and ICTR, the ECCC does not require that the
information provided in the indictment be concise. Neither does the ECCC use a prima facie
standard of proof to confirm the indictment. The ECCC, also unlike the STL, ICTY, and ICTR,
explicitly requires the indictment to state the accused’s mode of criminal responsibility.

10

See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 17(4) (2007) (“Upon a determination that a
prima facie case exists, the Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of the facts and the
crime or crimes with which the accused is charged under the Statute. The indictment shall be transmitted to a judge
of the Trial Chamber.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
11

See Rules of Evidence and Procedure for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 47(C) (Mar. 14,
2008) (“The indictment shall set forth the name and particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the facts of
the case and of the crime with which the suspect is charged.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
12

Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (REV. 5), Rule 67(2) (Feb. 9, 2010)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
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D. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) establishes that the accused
has a right:
Art. 17(4)(a): To be informed promptly and in detail in a language
which he or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge
against him or her;13
This language is identical to Article 16(4)(a) of the STL’s Statute.14 The SCSL’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence—which are based on the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence15—
provides the following requirements for indictments:
Rule 47(C): The indictment shall contain, and be sufficient if it
contains, the name and particulars of the suspect, a statement of
each specific offence of which the named suspect is charged and a
short description of the particulars of the offence. It shall be
accompanied by a Prosecutor’s case summary briefly setting out
the allegations he proposes to prove in making his case.16
The SCSL, like the other tribunals, requires identification of the accused, an enumeration of the
offenses alleged, and the facts related to those offenses. Like the ECCC, however, and unlike the
ICTY and ICTR, the SCSL does not use a prima facie standard when confirming indictments,
resulting in less judicial review of the indictment process.17 Among the ad hoc tribunals, the

13

Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17(4)(a) (Jan. 16, 2002) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 34].
14

See supra, note 4 and accompanying text.

TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 16 (Mar. 2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
15

16

Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rule 47(C) (May 27, 2008) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
17

PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 15, at 22.
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SCSL uniquely requires that the indictment be accompanied by a “Prosecutor’s case
summary.”18
E. The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has a different process for charging offenses
than the ad hoc tribunals and does not use the term “indictment.” The ICC has two different
types of charging documents: a summons or warrant of arrest containing preliminary charges and
a document with the charges the Prosecutor will bring at trial.19 The Rome Statute of the ICC
requires the summons or warrant to contain:
Art. 58(2). The application of the Prosecutor shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying
information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court which the person is alleged to have committed;
(c) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute
those crimes;
(d) A summary of the evidence and any other information which
establish reasonable grounds to believe that the person
committed those crimes; and
(e) The reason why the Prosecutor believes that the arrest of the
person is necessary.20
Art. 58(3). The warrant of arrest shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying
information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court for which the person's arrest is sought; and
(c) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute
those crimes.21

18

Supra, note 16.

19

TOCHILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3.

20

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 58(2), U.N. DOC. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
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Sections (a), (b), and (c) of Articles 57 and 58 are similar to requirements found in the other
tribunals. Article 57(d), requiring a summary of evidence, has no equivalent within the STL, and
Article 57(e), which relates to arrest, is also inapplicable. The differences between the ICC’s
charging process and that of the ad hoc tribunals may mean that ICC case law is of limited
relevance to the STL on this issue. It has been argued, however, that the similarities in the
requirements for indictments in the ad hoc tribunals and the charging documents in the ICC are
strong enough that ad hoc tribunal jurisprudence would be relevant to the ICC, so it is possible
that the opposite is true as well.22
III.

PARTICULARITY OF MATERIAL FACTS
A. Insufficiently Particular Indictments

An indictment is defective unless it pleads the material facts with sufficient
particularity.23 The jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR is clear that the Prosecution does
not have to plead the evidence in the indictment.24 The indictment should provide the accused
with enough information to fairly prepare a defense. In the words of the ICTR’s Appellate
Chamber:
21

Id. art. 58(3).

TOCHILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3 (“However, in spite of the above differences, the requirements as to the pleading
of the material facts in an indictment, particularities in the structure of an indictment, etc., that have been developed
in the ad hoc Tribunals, are highly relevant to the ICC. It is sufficient to say that the law relating to the contents and
requirements to an indictment in the ICC is similar to the relevant provisions in the Statutes and Rules of the ad hoc
Tribunals. Accordingly, the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence related to the indictments will assist those who will be
involved in both the application of ICC law and the development of its jurisprudence.”).
22

23

See, e.g., supra, note 1.

See, e.g., id. ¶ 27 (“It is well established in the case law of the International Tribunal that Articles 18(4) and 21(2),
(4)(a), and (4)(b) of the Statute require the Prosecution to plead in the indictment all material facts underpinning the
charges in the indictment, but not the evidence by which the material facts are to be proven.”); see also Prosecutor v.
Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Trial Judgment, ¶ 28 (July 15, 2004) (“[T]he indictment need not achieve
the impossible standard of reciting all aspects of the evidence against the accused as it will unfold at trial.”)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
24
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An Indictment is aimed at providing the accused with ‘a
description of the charges against him with sufficient particularity
to enable him to mount his defence.’ Accordingly, the indictment
must be sufficiently specific, meaning that it must reasonably
inform the accused of the material charges, and their criminal
characterisation.25
When preparing an indictment, therefore, a Prosecutor should write it not only with the purpose
of informing the court what charges are being brought against the accused, but also to provide
the accused with enough information to prepare a defense. A useful technique when preparing
an indictment might be for the Prosecutor to ask herself whether she would have enough
information from that indictment to prepare an adequate defense if she were representing the
accused.
B. Determining Whether a Fact is Material
Due to the requirement of providing the accused with sufficient information, the
indictment must be more than a list of charges.26 The indictment must also provide the material
facts underpinning the charges.27 Whether a fact is material “depends on the nature of the
Prosecution’s case.”28 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY addressed what constituted material
facts in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, et al.29 The Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic emphasized that

25

Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 301 (May 26, 2003) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 23]; see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶
209 (July 29, 2004) (“[T]he question whether an indictment is pleaded with sufficient particularity is dependent
upon whether it sets out the material facts of the Prosecution case with enough detail to inform a defendant clearly
of the charges against him so that he may prepare his defence.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
26

See Kvocka, et al., Appellate Judgment, ¶ 28 (An indictment which merely lists the charges against the accused
without pleading the material facts does not constitute adequate notice because it lacks “enough detail to inform a
defendant clearly of the charges against him so that he may prepare his defence”.).
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appellate Judgment (Oct. 23, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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materiality of a fact “cannot be decided in the abstract.”30 The Appeals Chamber found that a
“decisive factor” in determining the degree of specificity required of material facts in an
indictment is the nature of the criminal conduct alleged:
For example, in a case where the Prosecution alleges that an
accused personally committed the criminal acts, the material facts,
such as the identity of the victim, the time and place of the events
and the means by which the acts were committed, have to be
pleaded in detail.31
The ICTR’s Appeals Chamber embraced the Kupreskic decision’s approach in Prosecutor v.
Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana.32
C. Variables for Determining Degree of Specificity Required
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has identified seven variables for a tribunal to
consider when determining whether an indictment is pleaded with sufficient specificity:
1. The nature of the allegations;
2. The nature of the specific crimes charged;
3. The scale or magnitude on which the acts or events allegedly took
place;
4. The circumstances under which the acts were committed;
5. The duration of time over which the acts or events constituting the
crimes occurred;
6. The time span between the occurrence of the events and the filing of
the indictment; and
7. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
alleged crimes.33
30

Id. ¶ 89.

31

Id.

Cases Nos. ICTR-96-10-A & ICTR-96-17-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 24 (Dec. 13, 2004) (“The law governing
challenges to the vagueness of an indictment is set out in detail in the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s Judgement [sic] in
Kupreskic.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
32

33

Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2003-05-PT, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion for Defects
in the Formof the Indictment, ¶ 8 (Oct. 13, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27]. It should be
noted that the language in the Decision indicates this list is not necessarily exhaustive. This decision also includes a
list of twelve propositions regarding what the SCSL Trial Chamber considered representative of the main body of
law regarding international criminal indictments, which it derived from ICTR and ICTY case law. Id. ¶ 7.

16

In addition to the variables mentioned above, international tribunals also consider the alleged
proximity of the accused to the alleged criminal acts. As the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber states:
[T]he Prosecutor’s characterization of the alleged criminal conduct
and the proximity between the accused and the crime charged are
decisive factors in determining the degree of specificity with which
the Prosecutor must plead the material facts of his case in the
indictment.34
The closer the accused’s proximity to the underlying criminal acts is alleged to have been, the
more specificity is required of the indictment.35 Therefore, an indictment must provide far more
detail when it alleges that the accused personally carried out the alleged criminal acts than if it
alleges that the accused ordered the commission of that act. This is illustrated in the Blaskic
judgment of the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber
When alleging that the accused personally carried out the acts
underlying the crime in question, it is necessary for the Prosecution
to set out the identity of the victim, the place and approximate date
of the alleged criminal acts, and the means by which they were
committed ‘with the greatest precision.’ However, where it is
alleged that the accused planned, instigated, ordered, or aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the alleged
crimes, then the Prosecution is required to identify the ‘particular
acts’ or ‘the particular course of conduct’ on the part of the
accused which forms the basis for the charges in question.36
This means that if a Prosecutor indicts Sgt. X, a soldier, for murdering civilians, the indictment
must provide, to the extent the Prosecutor is able, the identities of those civilians, the location

34

Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 324 (Nov. 28,
2007) (also known as the “Media” trial) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]; See also Kvocka, et al.,
Appellate Judgment, ¶ 28 (“The Prosecution’s characterization of the alleged criminal conduct and the proximity of
the accused to the underlying crime are decisive factors in determining the degree of specificity with which the
Prosecution must plead the material facts of its case in the indictment in order to provide the accused with adequate
notice.”).
35

Kupreskic, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 89 (“A decisive factor in determining the degree of specificity with which the
Prosecution is required to particularise the facts of its case in the indictment is the nature of the alleged criminal
conduct charged to the accused. For example, in a case where the Prosecution alleges that an accused personally
committed the criminal acts, the material facts, such as the identity of the victim, the time and place of the events
and the means by which the acts were committed, have to be pleaded in detail.”).
36

Blaskic, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 213.
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where the crime took place, when the crime happened, and how X killed the civilians. If,
however, that Prosecutor wants to indict Gen. Y, the general in command of X’s unit, for those
civilian deaths then the indictment must plead how Gen. Y is responsible—for example, by
describing Gen. Y’s position and what actions he took that led to the murders—but it does not
have to provide the same level of detail about the event itself as it would for Sgt. X. The further
removed the accused is alleged to have been from the physical perpetration of the crime the less
specific the indictment has to be.37 It is essential, therefore, that the indictment also specify what
the accused’s proximity to the alleged criminal act actually was.38
IV.

MODES OF LIABILITY

An indictment that pleads a mode of responsibility without corresponding material facts
is defective.39 Additionally, the accused’s mode of liability is itself always considered a material
fact.40 Different modes of liability require different levels of specificity and different types of
information. The tribunals draw distinction on the degree of precision required when pleading
an indictment depending on whether the accused is alleged to have:
1. individual responsibility by personally carrying out the underlying acts;

Prosecutor v. Delic, Case No. IT-04-83-PT, Decision on the Prosecution’s Submission of Proposed Indictment
and Defence Motion Alleging Defects in Amended Indictment, ¶ 85 (June 30, 2006) (“If the accused is alleged to
have been in a senior leadership position and is not alleged to have personally perpetrated any of the underlying
substantive crimes in the indictment as is in the case at hand, then less precision is required in an indictment’s
description of them.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
37

38

Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Objections by Radoslav Brdanin to the Form
of the Amended Indictment, ¶ 13 (Feb. 23, 2001) (“it is essential for the accused to know from the indictment just
what that alleged proximity is.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
39

Kvocka, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 41 (“[T]he Appeals Chamber finds that in pleading modes of responsibility for
which no corresponding material facts are pleaded, the Indictment is vague and is therefore defective.”).
40

Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 31 (Feb. 25,
2004) (“The mode and extent of an accused’s participation in an alleged crime are always material facts that must be
clearly set forth in the indictment.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
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2. individual responsibility where the accused did not personally carry out the the
underlying acts; or
3. superior responsibility for the alleged offenses.41
A. Personal Responsibility
Cases where the accused is alleged to have personally committed the underlying criminal
acts require the greatest degree of precision in the indictment. As the ICTY Trial Chamber
states:
Where the accused is alleged to have personally committed the acts
pleaded in the indictment, greater precision is required in the
pleading– the information pleaded as material facts, so far as it is
possible to do so, should include the identity of the victim, the
places and the approximate dates of those acts and the means by
which the offence was committed.42
This mode of liability is, therefore, on the end of the spectrum requiring the most detail. Since
the indictment must provide the accused with enough information to prepare a defense, it is
imperative that the highest level of detail be provided in cases where the accused is alleged to
have personally committed the acts in question.
For example, if Sgt. X is indicted for the murder of civilians then the indictment must
inform him of the identity of the victims, the location where the crime occurred, and the date
when it occurred so he defend himself against the charges. Sgt. X must know precisely what the
incident was so he can argue mistake of fact or mitigating factors or some other defense strategy.

Blaskic, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 211 (“A distinction has been drawn in the International Tribunal’s jurisprudence
between the level of specificity required when pleading: (i) individual responsibility under Article 7(1) in a case
where it is not alleged that the accused personally carried out the acts underlying the crimes charged; (ii) individual
responsibility under Article 7(1) in a case where it is alleged that the accused personally carried out the acts in
question; and (iii) superior responsibility under Article 7(3).”); see also TOCHILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 35.
41

42

Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of
the Indictment, ¶ 8 (Nov. 15, 2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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The specific date and location, for instance, are vital because they might allow the accused to
argue that he was not in the area at the time of the alleged incident. The closer the accused’s
proximity to the crime is alleged to have been, the more important those facts which relate to the
proximity of the crime become in order to adequately put the accused on notice. 43 If the accused
is alleged to have personally committed the crime with others, however, the identity of any
unknown persons with whom the accused is alleged to have acted is not a material fact which
must be pleaded with particularity in the indictment.44
B. Accomplice Liability
The indictment should inform the accused not only of his own alleged acts which are
alleged to have created his criminal responsibility, but also the acts of his alleged accomplices if
a type of accomplice liability is pleaded. As the ICTR Trial Chambers states:
The specificity required to plead the identity of the victims, the
time and place of the events, and the means by which the acts were
committed is not as high where criminal responsibility is
predicated on accomplice liability or superior responsibility. The
Chamber emphasises, however, that the accused must be informed
not only of his own alleged conduct giving rise to criminal
responsibility but also of the acts and crimes of his alleged
subordinates or accomplices.45

43

See Muhimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR- 95-1B-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 78 (May 21, 2007) (Finding that
general allegations that Muhimana “participated in the search for and attacks on Tutsi civilians” did not provide
adequate notice. “The Appellant could not have known, on the basis of the Indictment alone, that he was being
charged as part of this attack with personally killing Tutsis with a grenade, seriously wounding Witness BC, and
killing her children.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
44

Prosecutor v. Lukic & Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on the Form of the Indictment, ¶ 4 (May 11,
2006) (“[T]he Trial Chamber does not consider that the identity of “unknown” persons is a material fact that must be
pleaded here to enable Lukic to prepare a defense. The Prosecution has alleged the relevant times, places, methods
and victims of the crimes with which Lukic is charged; the Chamber cannot conclude that Lukic’s not being told the
identity of “unknown” people with whom he might have acted is a defect that unfairly prejudices his ability to
defend himself.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
45

Ntagerura et al., Trial Judgment, ¶ 35.
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The indictment should provide as much detail as possible regarding the identity of the alleged
accomplices and their alleged relationship with the accused. General phrases like “acting in
concert with others” do not provide enough detail. In order to be able to rebut charges arising
from a form of accomplice liability, the accused must be made aware of who his alleged
accomplices were, the nature of their relationship, and the actions of those accomplices that
created his own liability.46 The ICTY Trial Chamber explains:
Where it is alleged that the accused planned, instigated, ordered, or
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the
alleged crimes, the Prosecution is required to indentify the
particular acts or course of conduct of the accused which form the
basis for the allegations. In these circumstances the Prosecution
must also plead the acts for which it is alleged the accused is to be
held responsible, subject to the Prosecution’s ability to provide
such particulars.47
The level of specificity required when pleading those types of liability is not, however, as high as
it is when the accused is alleged to have personally committed the underlying criminal acts.48
C. Joint Criminal Enterprise
The concept of joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) is not expressly included in any of the
Statutes of the tribunals, including that of the STL.49 It did not explicitly arise as a legal concept

46

See Prosecutor v. Strugar et al., Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion Concerning
Form of the Indictment, ¶ 22 (June 28, 2002) (“It is alleged that the Accused acted ‘individually or in concert with
others.’ Four co-accused are named in the Indictment. The Prosecution is directed to clarify if reference to “others”
relates only to the four co-accused and their subordinates or others in that chain of command. If not, the “others”
should be identified (to the extent possible and without being in violation of obligations of confidentiality, if any)
together with their relation to the Accused in respect of the acts charged in the Indictment.”) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
Prosecutor v. Cermak & Markac, Case No. IT-03-73-PT, Decision on Ivan Cermak’s and Mladen Markac’s
Motions on Form of Indictment, ¶ 7 (Mar. 8, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
47

Id. (“The precision required for these acts however is not the same as that required when the accused is alleged to
have personally committed the acts.”).
48

49

See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. RES. 1757, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (2007).
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until the Appellate Chamber of the ICTY recognized it in the Tadic case.50 If the STL decides to
recognize JCE as a mode of liability then it will have to be specifically pleaded along with
supporting material facts, like any other mode of liability.51 JCE is considered a form of
“commission,” but if the accused physically committed any of the crimes as a part of the JCE
then that must be specifically pleaded as well.52
The ICTY Trial Chamber gives this explanation of what is required when pleading JCE:
In the case of a joint criminal enterprise, the following elements
need to be pleaded: the nature or essence of the joint criminal
enterprise; the period over which the enterprise is said to have
existed; the identity of those engaged in the enterprise, at least by
reference to a group; and the nature of the participation of the
accused in the enterprise. In Brdanin, the Trial Chamber held that
the relevant state of mind of the accused may be pleaded, either by
pleading the evidentiary facts from which the state of mind is to be
inferred from, or by pleading the relevant state of mind itself as the
material fact.53
There are three different types of JCE:
1. Basic;
2. Systematic; and

50

See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 220 (July 15, 1999) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
Simba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 63 (Nov. 27, 2007) (“Failure to specifically
plead JCE, including the supporting material facts and the category, constitutes a defect in the indictment.”)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
51

Prosecutor v. Mejakic et al., Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Amend Consolidated
Indictment Schedules A through F, the Rule 65 ter Witness Summaries, and the Pre-Trial Brief Incident Summaries,
pp. 4–5 (Dec. 17, 2004) (“[T]he Trial Chamber is unable to accept the Prosecution submission that the two forms of
liability are essentially the same: while participation in a joint criminal enterprise is a form of “commission” under
Article 7(1) of the Statute, where the Prosecution intends to suggest that an accused physically perpetrated a crime, it
must expressly say so, and the nature of his alleged individual responsibility should be made clear to the accused.”)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
52

53

Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 145 (Oct. 17, 2003) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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3. Extended.54
When pleading JCE as a mode of liability, the indictment must specify which type of JCE is
being alleged.55 In addition to the type of JCE, the indictment must plead the purpose of the
JCE, what role the accused played in the JCE, and the identity of the accused’s co-conspirators in
the JCE.56
D. Superior Responsibility
i. Material Facts Related to Superior Responsibility
Superior responsibility, like all modes of liability, must be specifically pleaded.57 When
pleading superior responsibility, the indictment must inform the accused, as far as the Prosecutor
is able, of both his own conduct that gave rise to his responsibility as a superior as well as the
conduct of the subordinates for whom he is alleged to have had responsibility.58 The ICTY
Appellate Chamber held that and indictment alleging superior responsibility must plead:

54

(i)

that the accused is the superior of

(ii)

subordinates sufficiently identified,

TOCHILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 18.

55

Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 24 (July 7, 2006) (also known as
the “Cyangugu case”) (“In order for an accused charged with joint criminal enterprise to fully understand which acts
he is allegedly responsible for, the indictment should clearly indicate which form of joint criminal enterprise is being
alleged.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 389 (Dec. 13, 2005) (“In addition, the
Prosecution must also plead the purpose of the enterprise, the identity of the co-participants, and the nature of the
accused’s participation in the enterprise.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
56

57

Supra note 40 and accompanying text.

Blaskic, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 216 (“In relation to an allegation of superior responsibility, the accused needs to
know not only what is alleged to have been his own conduct giving rise to his responsibility as a superior, but also
what is alleged to have been the conduct of those persons for which he is alleged to be responsible, subject to the
Prosecution’s ability to provide those particulars.”).
58
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(iii)

over whom he had effective control – in the sense of a material ability to
prevent or punish criminal conduct – and

(iv)

for whose acts he is alleged to be responsible.59

Regarding the accused’s conduct, the indictment must also plead that the accused:
(i)

have known or had reason to know that the crimes were about to be
committed or had been committed by his subordinates, and

(ii)

the related conduct of those others for whom he is alleged to be
responsible, and

(iii)

the conduct of the accused by which he may be found to have failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the persons who committed them.60

The acts of the accused’s alleged subordinates can be stated with less precision because
particulars about those acts are often unknown and because it is usually the acts of the alleged
superior and not the alleged subordinates at issue in regards to superior responsibility.61
When pleading superior responsibility, it is the nature of the relationship between the
accused and the alleged subordinates, along with the accused’s authority and knowledge in that
relationship, that are most important. In the words of the ICTR’s Trial Chamber:
Where superior responsibility is alleged, the relationship of the
accused to his subordinates is most material, as are his knowledge

59

Id. ¶ 281.

60

Id.

Id. (“The facts relevant to the acts of those others for whose acts the accused isalleged to be responsible as a
superior, although the Prosecution remains obliged to give all the particulars which it is able to give, will usually be
stated with less precision, because the detail of those acts are often unknown, and because the acts themselves are
often not very much in issue[.]”).
61
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of the crimes and the necessary and reasonable measures that he
failed to take to prevent the crimes or to punish his subordinates.62
Ensuring that the accused knew that he failed to prevent or punish the alleged criminal acts of
those under his command is essential for an indictment to be sufficiently precise when pleading
superior responsibility.63
When pleading superior responsibility within a civilian context, the Prosecutor must
allege a prima facie case that the accused exercised sufficient control over alleged subordinates.
Merely giving the relationship between the accused and the alleged subordinate, such as
employer/employee or members of the same family, is insufficient. The Prosecution must
supply enough information showing how the relationship between the accused and the alleged
subordinate constitutes a prima facie case for superior responsibility.64
ii. Requirements Regarding the Identity of the Alleged Subordinates
An indictment pleading superior responsibility does not have to identify the alleged
subordinates involved by name. It is sufficient to identify them by their category or official
position, or as a group. The ICTY’s Trial Chamber states:

62

Ntagerura et al., Trial Judgment, ¶ 33.

Cermak & Markac, Decision on Ivan Cermak’s and Mladen Markac’s Motions on the Form of the Indictment, ¶
10.
63

64

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kabuga, Case No. ICTR-98-44B-PT, Decision on the Amended Indictment, ¶ 10 (June 24,
2005) (“Concerning the charges of individual criminal liability, the Chamber finds that wherever the Prosecutor
alleges that the Accused had de facto control over RTLM, Interahamwe and administrative officers among others
alleged perpetrators and was in a position to prevent or punish criminal conduct . . . additional details are required to
allow the Accused to know the charges against him. As the Chamber has previously ruled in Zigiranyirazo Case, the
pleading of family ties is not sufficient to support an allegation of command responsibility. The Chamber also finds
that the allegation contained in Paragraph 44 of the Amended Indictment has not given sufficient particulars about
the control the Accused allegedly exercised and the protection allegedly provided to the Accused by persons under
his alleged control. Those details in Paragraphs 2 and 44 should be provided by including further information upon
which this allegation is grounded.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
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In respect of the allegations by the Kvocka Defence as to lack of
information regarding the participation of others in the crimes, the
Trial Chamber notes the finding in the Krnojelac Decision as to
Form that, if the Prosecution is unable to identify those directly
participating in the alleged criminal acts by name, “it will be
sufficient for it to identify them at least by reference to their
‘category’ (or their official position) as a group”.65
Groups can be sufficiently identified by their status and presence at a specified location at a
specified time. The ICTR found this type of identification sufficient in the Zigiranyirazo case:
The Chamber notes that Paragraph 14 of the Third Amended
Indictment specifies that Rurunga Hill is located in Rwili secteur,
Gaseke commune, in Gisenyi prefecture, within the vicinity of the
Rubaya tea factory as well as the approximative date of the events
referred to (about the week of 14 to 20 April 1994) . . . . The
Chamber finds this sufficient. The Chamber further notes, with
regard to the names of the attackers, references are made to
specified groups of them, identified in similar ways throughout the
Indictment. These groups are deemed to be sufficiently identified
by their status and presence at a specific location at the indicated
time. Their individual names are not necessary to enable the
Defence to prepare its case.66
The accused then, is not unable to prepare a defense merely because the indictment does not
provide the names of the alleged subordinates. Identifying the subordinates by their membership
in a category or a group that can itself be identified by its status and presence at a specified place
and time is sufficient, provided the Prosecution provides those details with enough precision.
For example, an indictment alleging Gen. Y was responsible, through superior
responsibility, for Sgt. X’s murder of civilians does have to identify Sgt. X by name.67 If the

65

Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30-PT, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motions on the Form of
the Indictment, ¶ 22 (Apr. 12, 1999) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
66

Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-R72, Decision on Defence Motions (i) Objecting to the
Form of the Third Amended Indictment and (ii) Requesting the Harmonisation or Reconsideration of the Decision of
2 March 2005, ¶ 11 (Sept. 22, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
67

The indictment should provide the names of the subordinates if the Prosecutor is aware of such details. Tribunals
have been very clear that identification through group or category is acceptable only “if the Prosecution is unable to
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indictment identifies Sgt. X as: “a soldier in the 11th Brigade present at Blackacre Village,
Province of Greenacre on May 5, 2005,” then a tribunal might find that identification sufficient.
Given that information, Gen. Y should be able prepare a defense. This alternative form of
identification may be the best method of identifying subordinates if the identity of the alleged
subordinates in question is not certain. Tribunals have found indictments to be defective, for
example, when they alleged the wrong group of soldiers committed the alleged acts.68
As with all parts of the indictment, the key issue in identifying subordinates is providing
enough information for the accused to prepare a defense. The international tribunal case law
holds that this can be done without the names of alleged subordinates. Identification by category
or status in a group, which can be placed at a specific place at a specific time is sufficient.
V.

APPLICATION TO THE STL
The standards for indictments are fairly uniform throughout the international tribunals. It

is possible, however, that the unique nature of the STL could mean that the prevailing standards
for precision might not apply. The other tribunals allow for a lower degree of specificity in
indictments relative to domestic legal systems.69 This is because of the nature of the crimes
involves factors like: large number of victims, making identification and enumeration of each

identify those directly participating in the alleged criminal acts by name.” Supra note 65 and accompanying text
(emphasis added).
68

Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55 A-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 35–40 (August 29, 2008) (finding
the indictment defective because it alleged the wrong group of soldiers committed the rapes in question) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
69

E.g. Prosecutor v. Stanisic, Case No. IT-04-79-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of the
Indictment, ¶ 21 (July 19, 2005) (“With regard to particulars, the degree of detail that is required presents a special
difficulty. The Trial Chamber recognizes that the massive scale of the crimes alleged to have occurred – and in a
time of armed conflict in which there was a breakdown of the ordinary social structures of the community – limits
the capacity of the Prosecution to provide particulars to the same degree as would be usual in a domestic criminal
law system.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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one impractical or impossible;70 the events in question taking place in a period of great upheaval,
such as war or civil war, making accurate recollections and accounts difficult to find;71 and the
amount of time between the events and the investigation, making it difficult for witnesses to give
precise dates or recall precise conversations.72
The STL is unique in that its jurisdiction involves only the assassination of Hariri and
related terrorist acts. The STL is empowered to investigate and prosecute: “the attack of 14
February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the
death or injury of other persons” and related terrorist attacks.73 There is not a large amount of
victims to identify compared to the crimes faced by tribunals like the ICTR or the ICTY. The
event is comparatively well-documented and it is possible that a judge might determine the event
did not occur in a situation as chaotic as the Rwandan Genocide or the Balkan Wars.
Additionally, the event was fairly recent compared to the Cambodian Genocide, for example, and
investigations began soon after the attack compared to many of the other tribunals.
Yet, these differences should not necessarily impose a higher specificity standard on the
STL indictments. Since the victims and their cause and time of death can all be specifically
identified in the indictment, there is no need to argue that section should lack particularity.
Additionally, the STL faces its own set of obstacles that could make getting details difficult or
impossible. For example, the possibility of the involvement of a foreign government that is
unlikely to cooperate with investigators could be argued to be a factor, like the chaos of civil
war, which justifies requiring less specific information from indictments. Finally, this standard
70

Id.

71

Id.

72

This factor is not constant across the tribunals. The ECCC, for example, has a much greater time lapse between
the events in question and the operation of the tribunal than the ICTY.
73

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 1.
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for indictment specificity has been generally accepted across the international tribunals.
Maintaining it for the STL is important for consistency within the international criminal regime.
Creating a different standard for each tribunal would create confusion and be counterproductive
to the goals of international criminal law.
VI.

CONCLUSION
It is recognized throughout the tribunals that an indictment is pleaded with sufficient

particularity if it concisely sets out the material facts of the Prosecution’s case with enough detail
that the accused has enough information about the charged brought against him that he can
prepare a defense. What is “material” depends on the nature of the Prosecution’s case. The
accused’s ability to prepare a defense is the driving force behind much of the jurisprudence on
the subject. It is for that reason the indictment must clearly and precisely allege the mode of
liability and the accused’s proximity to the alleged acts. The accused’s proximity also
determines the level of detail required in the indictment.
When pleading superior responsibility, that mode of liability must be specifically alleged.
The nature of the relationship between the accused and the alleged subordinates must be clearly
pleaded, as well as information explaining how this relationship gave rise to the accused’s
responsibility as a superior. The accused should also be aware of what criminal acts he was
alleged to have failed to prevent or punish. In the event that the Prosecutor cannot identify the
alleged subordinates by name in the indictment, they may be identified by their category or status
in a group. Groups can be sufficiently identified by their presence at a certain location at a
certain time.
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The current standards for precision of indictments before international tribunals are a
result of the unique nature of the crimes they are designed to prosecute. The STL is unusual
among the tribunals in both the scope and nature of the event that inspired its creation. It is
possible, therefore, that the current standards might not apply to indictments before the STL.
There are still good reasons why they should, however, and a strong argument can be made that
the prevailing standard should apply.
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